Appellant horse racing board sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of Riverside County (California), which granted a writ of mandate requiring the board to issue a license to respondent corporation enabling it to conduct thoroughbred horse racing meetings at a proposed site.
The corporation filed an application with the board for a license to conduct thoroughbred horse racing at a certain location. The application was filed pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 19480.5, generally referred to as the California Horse Racing Act. The application was heard before the board, which denied the application. The corporation filed a proceeding in the superior court pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5 requesting a writ of mandate requiring the board to issue it a license. The superior court granted the writ of mandate and the board appealed. The court reversed the judgment of the superior court. The ADA compliance California held that the findings of the board were findings of the ultimate facts by an administrative agency in the general language of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5(c) and were sufficient. The court held that the evidence which revealed the 14-day limitation of racing at the proposed site, the geographical location of the proposed site, the population of the area, and the testimony of breeders and track operators, together with the board's visit to the area, constituted substantial evidence to support the board's findings. The court reversed the judgment of the superior court that granted a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the board to issue a license to the corporation enabling it to conduct thoroughbred horse racing meetings at a proposed site. The court directed the superior court to enter its order denying the peremptory writ. Plaintiff shareholders appealed from the judgment, claiming the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) awarded inadequate damages, and defendant shareholders A and B appealed, claiming the trial court award was excessive, in an action for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation and the recovery of profits wrongfully diverted by the controlling officers, directors, and stockholders. Plaintiff shareholders filed an action for involuntary dissolution of a corporation and recovery of profits wrongfully diverted. Judgment was entered in favor of defendant shareholders A and B. On review, the court reversed the judgment against defendant shareholders A and B. It found that defendant A, the majority shareholder, did not abuse his duties as a director when he approved a transaction which diverted substantial functions of the corporation to company number two and deprived plaintiff minority stockholders of substantial benefits. Defendant A, unaware that minority shareholders existed, believed his actions protected all shareholders. Plaintiffs had secretly bought stock in corporation from defendant shareholder C, who alone took plaintiffs' profits generated by the creation of company two. Further, defendant A properly offered stock from his own shares to defendant B, a lesser shareholder, at a discount upon hiring him to offer a greater stake in the success of the corporation. The court modified the judgment against defendant C who secretly sold the stock, to provide that the inflated salary he received from the corporation be distributed among all shareholders. The court reversed the judgment for plaintiff shareholders on liability issues of defendant shareholders A and B, vacated with respect to attorneys' fees and costs, and remanded the issue to the lower court for consideration on retrial. The judgment ordering the amount that the corporation recover from defendant C was modified. The judgment ordering the corporation to pay defendant B was modified to provide the full face value of stock he owned.
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Plaintiffs, individual and corporation, challenged the grant of summary judgment by the Superior Court of Orange County (California), in favor of defendant credit reporting agency in plaintiffs' action for defamation, interference with prospective economic advantage, injurious falsehood, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the publishing of a credit report.
Plaintiffs, individual and corporation, filed an action against defendant credit reporting agency after defendant published a credit report regarding plaintiff corporation which plaintiff individual was affiliated with. The credit report referred to bankruptcies that plaintiff corporation had filed in the previous years. Plaintiffs alleged that after the California false claims act credit report was published, plaintiff corporation lost a line of credit, factoring arrangement, and loan. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and asserted that all the statements were true. Plaintiffs conceded that every statement in the report was uncontroverted but, the report taken as a whole implied plaintiff individual was responsible for the bankruptcies. The trial court granted the motion and plaintiffs appealed. The court affirmed the judgment finding that the truth of the credit report was a complete defense. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant credit reporting agency in plaintiffs', individual and corporation, action for defamation, interference with prospective economic advantage, injurious falsehood, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court found that the truth of the credit report was an absolute defense. Respondent husband sought review from Superior Court of Fresno County (California), which overturned the trial court's judgment, which enforced the oral stipulation between respondent and appellant wife in marriage dissolution action. The trial court held that the agreement was made "before the court," pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 664.6. The appellate court overturned and held that the stipulation was not made "before the court." Respondent husband and appellant wife agreed to an oral stipulation before a final arbiter who was empowered to adjudicate and render a determination of the issues in marriage dissolution action. The trial court held that the stipulation was made "before the court," pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 664.6 and entered judgment enforcing the settlement. Appellant sought review and contended that respondent had hidden money from her. The appellate court overturned the trial court and held that the settlement had not been made "before the court." The court held that the arbiter was empowered to exercise what were essentially judicial functions. The court determined that, because the arbiter was acting in the capacity granted to him by the trial court and because the stipulation was orally presented to the arbiter, the settlement was made "before the court" within the meaning of the statute. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, which enforced the settlement, with remand to consider the issue of ancillary award of sanctions. The court reversed the judgment of appellate court and affirmed the judgment of trial court, which held that oral stipulation between respondent husband and appellant wife in marriage dissolution was made "before the court," pursuant to state statute. The court held that because the arbiter was empowered to exercise judicial functions and was acting in the capacity granted to him by the trial court, the oral presentment was "before the court." |
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