Appellant doctor sought review of the decision from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which denied appellant's petition for writ of mandate to review the decision of respondent medical board that permanently revoked his license to practice medicine.
Appellant doctor sought review from a judgment of the superior court that denied his petition for writ of mandate, which sought review of a decision of respondent medical board which permanently revoked his license to practice medicine. Appellant gave a child an injection and prescribed medicine, which the child's mother gave him as directed. The child was taken to the emergency room, where a physician administered medicine that counteracted the narcotic overdose. A San Diego class action lawyer accusation was filed charging appellant with gross negligence and incompetence in treating the child. After a hearing before an administrative law judge, respondent issued a proposed decision, which revoked appellant's license to practice medicine. The superior court exercised its independent judgment upon the evidence to uphold respondent's decision, and rendered judgment denying the writ of mandate. On appeal, the court found that the evidence demonstrated that the phrasing of a hypothetical question was not prejudicial to appellant. The court found that it could not disturb the verdict of respondent unless there had been a manifest abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the judgment of the superior court. The court affirmed the judgment of the superior court revoking appellant doctor's license to practice medicine, because the courts could not disturb the verdict of respondent medical board unless there had been a manifest abuse of discretion. In a divorce proceeding, respondent wife sought, among other things, custody and support of the minor child. Appellant husband averred that the child was not his. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California) awarded custody of the child to the wife and ordered the husband to pay child support and alimony. The property was divided and the husband was ordered to pay the wife's attorney fees for trial and the appeal. The child in question was conceived when the wife and husband were separated. The husband's name was on the birth certificate and he accepted the child and acted as a father to the child. On appeal, the husband contended that the trial court erred in requiring him to pay for the support of the child; that it erred in not granting the prayer of his cross-complaint for a divorce, which, according to him, followed from his uncontradicted testimony; and that the court erred in allowing the additional attorney fees and costs upon appeal. After consideration, the court concluded that the record did not substantiate the wife's contention that there was an express oral contract for support of the child. The court also held that the husband was not estopped from questioning the legitimacy of the child. As to the husband's claim that he was entitled to a divorce on his cross-complaint alleging cruelty and excessive drinking, this court concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the divorce was properly granted to the wife. As to the award of attorney fees or costs, the husband failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in that award. The superior court's judgment was affirmed in all respects except that portion which ordered the husband to pay child support. That portion of the judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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Defendants, former employees of plaintiff employers, appealed a defamation judgment from the Superior Court of Santa Clara County (California), which was entered on a jury verdict. The judgment granted damages and a broad injunction.
The employees posted derogatory messages about the employers on Internet bulletin boards. The messages described the employers as incompetent liars and accused them of harassment and discrimination. The court affirmed the award of damages, finding the accusations to be libelous per se under Cal. Civ. Code § 45a. The court held that defamatory posts to the Internet were properly characterized as libel under Cal. Civ. Code § 45. Because Internet messages were a form of written communication, they could not be characterized as slander under Cal. Civ. Code § 46. The injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint, however, to the extent it prohibited future statements similar to the defamatory statements. Moreover, the injunction was invalid as applied to any persons not joined as parties. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 916 did not automatically stay trial pending an appeal from an order denying a Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 motion to strike; hence, the trial Top class action attorneys had jurisdiction to conduct the trial. The employers did not violate an order that stayed enforcement of the judgment when they advised newspapers and others that they believed certain published statements were defamatory. The court affirmed the judgment as modified to strike the prohibition of future statements and to strike all relief granted to persons who were not parties. The court dismissed the employees' motion for adjudication of contempt. Defendant buyer sought review of a judgment from a trial court (California), which was rendered in favor of plaintiff seller on his action to recover $ 20,000 from defendant, and to compel defendant to execute and deliver a mortgage to plaintiff for $ 40,000, which was the remainder of the purchase money for a boat. The seller and the buyer had entered into an agreement for the sale of a boat. The buyer refused to pay the remainder of the purchase money for the boat, and refused to execute the note for the boat because of a restraint of trade agreement between the Oregon and California steam companies. The trial court had rendered a judgment in the seller's favor on his action to recover a judgment of $ 20,000 against the buyer, and to compel the buyer to execute the note. On appeal, the court affirmed. The court found the restraint of trade agreement between the Oregon and California steam companies was void as against public policy because it did not contain reasonable limitations. The court found the restrictive covenant was too broad in that it applied to all routes of travel on the rivers, bays, or waters of the state. The court concluded that the buyer was required to pay the seller the remainder of the purchase money for the boat. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment that was rendered in favor of the seller on his action to recover $ 20,000 from the buyer, and to compel the buyer to execute and deliver a mortgage to the seller for $ 40,000, which was the remainder of the purchase money for a boat. After a denial of a motion for reconsideration, appellant challenged the judgment entered by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which held that respondents were not liable to appellant on an oral contract in an action in which appellant claimed breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and services rendered and benefits conferred.
Appellant was a producer of motion picture films. Appellant conceived an idea that constituted signing respondent actors and respondent director for production of the movie. After a series of negotiations, appellant had been replaced as the producer and respondents proceeded to begin production of the motion picture. Appellant contended that respondents were liable for appellant's services. When respondents refused to pay, appellant claimed a breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and services rendered and benefits conferred. The EEOC attorney reviewed the distinctions for an implied in fact contract and an express contract. In addition, the court reviewed whether appellant had a protectable property right in the idea. The court determined that the contract to compensate was valid. As appellant had fulfilled his duty, respondents were liable to appellant for a compensation of services. The court reversed the judgment entered by the superior court and held that respondents were liable to appellant because appellant's idea for a motion picture was protectable by contract and appellant had fulfilled the duty for which respondents had agreed to compensate. Defendant landlords appealed an order from the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), entering judgment for plaintiff former tenants and finding that defendant husband sexually harassed plaintiff wife in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et seq., and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 51 and 52. Defendants alleged that the claims did not fall under the statutes. Plaintiff former tenants brought suit against defendant landlords, claiming that defendant husband sexually harassed plaintiff wife in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et seq., and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Act), Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 51 and 52. The trial court awarded damages and attorney fees. Defendants appealed, claiming that the statutes did not cover plaintiffs' claims. Defendants also claimed the trial court erred in admitting bad character evidence regarding defendant husband. The appellate court reversed and remanded. In construing the FEHA with federal housing legislation and the purposes of the FEHA, the court found plaintiff's claims fell under the FEHA. However, because instructional error occurred, a new trial was ordered. Because sexual harassment by a landlord was not an enumerated form of actionable sex discrimination under the Act at the time the alleged conduct occurred, that verdict was reversed. Because the trial court erred in allowing extensive evidence of defendant husband's uncharged bad conduct, specifically, of his attempts to have sex with other tenants, reversal on this ground was required. The reviewing court reversed and remanded the appellate court's judgment finding defendant landlords committed sexual harassment against plaintiff former tenants. Because sexual harassment by a landlord was not a type of sex discrimination at the time the alleged conduct occurred, this claim was dismissed. However, where remaining claims were tainted by instructional and evidentiary error, a new trial was ordered. The Alameda County Superior Court, California, entered a judgment ordering defendant nonprofit organization, which developed and administered the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), to accommodate plaintiff applicants' request for testing accommodations under the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act (DPA). The trial court also entered an order awarding plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs. The organization appealed.
Plaintiffs, who had reading-related learning disabilities and or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, requested more time and or a private room in which to take the MCAT. The court concluded that neither the Unruh Act nor the DPA required testing accommodations for learning and reading-related disabilities. Accommodations were only required to the extent they were required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Nothing in the DPA could be reasonably construed to require a modification of the test procedures themselves, except to the extent necessary to guarantee physical access to the place where the test was administered. There was no allegation that the organization had failed to comply with the Demand letter breach of contract ADA in considering requests for accommodations on the MCAT; therefore, plaintiffs failed to establish their entitlement to relief under the Unruh Act. Plaintiffs did not allege or prove that the organization was motivated by an animus toward those with learning and reading-related disabilities or granted accommodation to other groups or disabled individuals that it did not grant to those with learning and reading-related disabilities. The judgment was reversed, as was the order awarding plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs. In a writ proceeding, petitioner bank challenged an order of the Superior Court of Alameda County, California, which compelled production of the bank's internal suspicious activity forms. In the underlying action, real parties in interest, defrauded investors, alleged that their losses would have been less if the bank had fulfilled its reporting obligations under the 1992 Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act. The bank claimed that its internal forms were generated as part of a procedure for preparing suspicious activity reports (SAR) required by federal law. The trial court found that the internal forms were supporting SAR documentation generated in the ordinary course of business and were not subject to an unqualified privilege preventing disclosure of SARs or their contents under 31 U.S.C.S. § 5318(g) and 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k). The court of appeal disagreed, finding that the SAR privilege extended to documents prepared for the purpose of investigating or drafting a possible SAR. The bank's form plainly served that purpose, and substantial evidence did not support an inference that it was a routine form. The forms were not made less a part of the investigative process by the fact that the employees who filled them out did not prepare the SAR; nor were they rendered "all purpose" by the fact that employees were encouraged to report suspicious transactions that might not meet the reporting threshold. Further, the forms echoed the official SAR form, thus telegraphing that an SAR was likely to be prepared and filed. The court also found that the bank had standing to assert the privilege. The court ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to vacate its orders and to enter a new and different order denying the investors' motion to compel. Plaintiff sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of Sacramento County (California), which sustained defendant bar association and defendant arbitrator's demurrer, and dismissed plaintiff's action for fraud on the grounds that defendants were immune from suit under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6200(e).
Plaintiff's action for fraud was dismissed after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrer of defendant bar association and defendant arbitrator. Defendants demurred on the basis they were immune from suit under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6200(e) as their alleged liability arose from defendants' having conducted a fee dispute arbitration between plaintiff and his former attorney. On review, plaintiff argued that statutory immunity did not apply because defendant arbitrator did not conduct the arbitration pursuant to the relevant statutes. The San Diego class action lawyer found that defendant arbitrator was entitled to immunity because the arbitration's structure and procedure were fashioned in accordance with the rules established under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6200 et seq., and the arbitration results from a request made pursuant to the statute's authority. Further, the court found that because defendant arbitrator was immune from liability, defendant bar association, as the sponsoring organization, was also immune from claims based exclusively on agency. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. The judgment, which dismissed plaintiff's action for fraud against defendant bar association and defendant arbitrator, was affirmed because the court agreed that defendants were statutorily immune from suit. Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of San Diego County (California) of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence, driving under the influence and causing injury to two victims, and driving with a blood alcohol content over .08 and causing injury to two victims. The court found great bodily injury enhancements in connection with all counts. Defendant appealed. Defendant spent a night drinking with her friends. Later, defendant shared the driving of her truck with one of her intoxicated friends. He fell asleep, and defendant continued to drive. A fatal accident then ensued, and defendant was convicted of various crimes. The court reversed defendant's conviction of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 192(c)(3) because it was a necessarily included offense in defendant's conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter. The court also reversed the enhancement under Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a) as to the injuries sustained by defendant's friend who shared driving with her because he was a potential accomplice to the charged crimes and the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury. While the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that the friend was an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial court did err in failing to submit the factual issue of whether the friend was an accomplice to the jury. However, the error was harmless because the evidence supported defendant's conviction. The court affirmed the remainder of defendant's convictions. The court reversed defendant's conviction of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence, and vacated the great bodily enhancement for injuries inflicted upon one of the victims and remanded with directions to the trial court. The court affirmed the remainder of the judgment. Plaintiff employees sued defendant employer and an associated entity for breach of contract and for age discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq., asserting breach of a promise to permit senior insurance sales agents to continue in their employ under relaxed sales quotas. The Santa Clara County Superior Court, California, entered summary judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed.
The court of appeal held that the breach of contract claim was not barred by the statute of limitations in Code Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. (1), because the employer did not breach the promise regarding its quota policy merely by announcing that it would no longer honor the policy. The cause of action of top business attorney did not accrue until, at the earliest, the employer first counseled an employee for failing to meet minimum production requirements that were contrary to the relaxed quotas. Further, the record raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the employer honored the policy for an agreed time, or if no agreement as to time could be inferred, for a reasonable time. Nothing before the court supported a conclusion that a "reasonable time" passed before the employer sought to nullify the policy. The employer received the benefit of the employees' loyalty and sought to renounce the policy shortly after they qualified for the promised benefit and before they actually sought to take advantage of it. For purposes of the FEHA disparate treatment claim, the record also presented triable issues of fact concerning the genuineness of defendants' claimed reasons for eliminating the policy. The court reversed the judgment with directions to set aside the order granting summary judgment and to enter a new order granting defendants' motion for summary adjudication as to disparate impact and retaliation claims and otherwise denying defendants' motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. Plaintiff pharmacy sued defendant medical group for dispensing drugs in violation of the Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 4170 and for unlawfully operating a retail pharmacy. The medical group moved the summary judgment, which was granted in favor of the medical group by the Superior Court of San Diego County (California). The pharmacy appealed. The physicians of the medical group individually dispensed drugs on a for-profit basis to their worker's compensation patients after informing the patients that they could get a prescription that could be filled anywhere. The pharmacy also alleged that the medical group interfered with its business by diverting patients away from the pharmacy and included causes of action for violations of unfair business practices. The appellate court found that: (1) under the provisions of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 4170 the medical group was entitled to dispense drugs on a for-profit basis to their patients as a part of their treatment, (2) maintaining a separate room to hold the drugs was not a "pharmacy" because the drugs were not for sale to the public, and (3) the legislative intent was to prohibit physicians from having a store where they sold drugs to the general public, and to limit physicians to dispensing drugs to their own patients for the condition for which the patient was seeking treatment. The judgment of the superior court was affirmed. Appellants cattlemen and feed lot operators sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), which sustained respondent grocery company's demurrer, without leave to amend, on the ground of res judicata and dismissed appellants' state law price fixing claim.
Appellants cattlemen and feed lot operators appealed the trial court's judgment that dismissed its action against respondent grocery company based on the doctrine of res judicata. The court affirmed the judgment that dismissed appellants cattlemen and feed lot operators state price fixing claim when it granted respondent grocery company's demurrer without leave to amend based on res judicata. The court held that the federal court based its dismissal of the first lawsuit EEOC defense attorney on a substantive determination that appellants had no cause of action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15, not on a lack of standing; thus, the dismissal was a judgment on the merits and appellants were barred by the doctrine of res judicata from further litigating the state law claim under the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq. The court also held that given the identity of facts between appellants' state and federal claims, it is probable that the district court would have retained jurisdiction over the state law claims in the first lawsuit and disposed of them along with appellants' federal claims by exercising pendent jurisdiction. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment because the dismissal of appellants cattlemen and feed lot operators' federal law suit was a judgment on the merits and appellants' were barred by the doctrine of res judicata from further litigating the state law theory since both claims were based on the same cause of action. Appellant, the proponent of an open-air composting project, sought review of a judgment and an order from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County (California), which decertified the final environmental impact report (FEIR) for the project and awarded attorney fees to respondents, two organizations that had challenged the approval of the project. The FEIR determined that an enclosed facility was an infeasible alternative to an open-air facility. This conclusion was based on cost information from only one enclosed facility, a consultant's statement that private financing would not be available for an enclosed facility, and the lack of electricity at the proposed site. The FEIR did not include a water supply assessment (WSA). The court held that substantial evidence did not support the finding that an enclosed facility alternative would not be feasible under Pub. Resources Code, § 21061.1. No meaningful comparative data was presented on cost issues, the consultant's statement was conclusory, and obtaining electricity was not discussed. The proposed open-air facility was a project under Wat. Code, § 10912, subd. (a)(5), because it met the acreage threshold, even if the structures would be small. Thus, a WSA was required pursuant to Wat. Code, §§ 10910, subd. (b), § 10911, subd. (b), and Pub. Resources Code, § 21151.9, regardless of whether a public water system would be involved. The WSA issue was adequately raised under Pub. Resources Code, § 21177, subd. (b), in the administrative proceedings, although § 10910 was not cited. The court affirmed the judgment, affirmed the attorney fees order, and remanded to the trial court for its determination of the amount of an award of attorney fees on appeal. Plaintiff retailers' association sought an injunction to prohibit defendant retailer from selling tobacco products at less than cost as provided in § 3 of the Unfair Practices Act, 1935 Cal. Stat. 1546 (Act). The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the injunction. The retailer appealed.
The retailer sold tobacco products at less than the lowest industry norm of the cost of doing business. The retailer engaged in this pricing in order to secure business from its competitors who were members of the retailers association. The object of the Act as set forth in § 13 was to prohibit, retailers with the intent to destroy competition or prevent it, from discriminatory pricing. This object was also stated in § 3 of Act as it defined, sales at less than cost. The California false claims act determined that the object of the Act was within the state's police power to protect the public. The court reached that conclusion based on its reasoning that the police power was elastic and kept with the growth of knowledge and the belief in the popular mind. Therefore, the police power was capable of expansion to meet existing conditions of modern life. The court next determined that the Act was reasonably related to that avowed purpose because although the state did not have the power to regulate all trade practices affecting competition, it clearly prohibited only the selling of products at below cost when the requisite intent to injure competitors or destroy competition was present. The court affirmed the judgment that enjoined the retailer from selling tobacco products at less than cost, based on its conclusion that the Unfair Practices Act was constitutional, and rationally related to its purpose to prevent competitors from injuring each other by predatory pricing and to protect the public welfare. Appellant city sought review of an order from the Los Angeles County Superior Court, California, which granted respondent medical marijuana collectives' request for a preliminary injunction against the city's enforcement of L.A. Mun. Code, § 45.19.6 et seq., an ordinance regulating the number and geographic distribution of medical marijuana collectives within city limits. The challenged ordinance allowed only medical marijuana collectives that had previously registered to continue. The court found no violation of equal protection by the ordinance because the city reasonably could have determined that previous registration was a valid predictor of law-abiding behavior going forward. The hypothetical possibility that some excluded collectives refused to register based not on an inclination towards lawlessness but on a belief that the law had expired, although theoretically "unfair" to some, did not violate equal protection. The ordinance did not provide for its own summary administrative enforcement apart from ordinary lawsuits or criminal prosecutions and thus did not implicate due process concerns. The court found that any expectation of privacy by a collective in the limited, and nonintimate, information sought by the ordinance to be unreasonable. Alternatively, it found any invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy to be justified by a legitimate and competing state interest. Because respondents did not demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits at trial, the trial court erred in granting the request for a preliminary injunction. The trial court's order granting the request for a preliminary injunction was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Appellants, chief of police and city, challenged an order of the Los Angeles County Superior Court (California), which found the county's policies of arraignment within 48 hours of arrest under Cal. Penal Code § 825 and denial of certain privileges to be impermissible.
Appellees, an indigent arrestee and individual taxpayers, filed a class action suit, alleging unnecessary delay in bringing detainees before the magistrate and improper jail conditions against appellants, chief of police and city. Appellants challenged an adverse judgment with business law lawyer. The appellate court affirmed judgment against appellants and held that it was unnecessary delay if detainees were not brought before a magistrate within two days, not 48 hours, of their arrest, that arrestee's' right to prompt arraignment outweighed the burden placed on appellants, and that appellants' inadequate financial resources was not an excuse for depriving detainees of their constitutional rights. Further, the court found that the trial court's order was proper in directing that arrestee's were entitled to sanitary conditions, family visits, reading and recreation materials, and medical and psychological treatment during detention. The court affirmed judgment against appellants, chief of police and city, because arraignment was required to be within two days, not 48 hours, and, while there were no statutory requirements as to jail conditions, they should be consistent with those applicable to prisons. Appellant challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California) dismissing his complaint filed under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §425.16, and awarding respondent attorney fees and costs. Appellant also filed a petition for writ of supersedeas, challenging the court's denial of his motion to quash respondent's subpoena duces tecum. Appellant sued respondent, an attorney, and her client, alleging defamation and other claims against respondent. Respondent filed a special motion to strike under the anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) statute, contending that the complaint was only intended to intimidate and punish her for assisting her client in exercising his right to address his property owners' association on the public issue of residential safety. The trial court granted respondent's motion, and awarded attorney fees and costs. Appellant filed an appeal and challenged respondent's attempted enforcement of the judgment. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed, holding that respondent, having successfully moved for dismissal with the assistance of specially appearing retained counsel, was entitled to reasonable attorney fees. Further, the perfecting of the appeal did not automatically stay enforcement of the judgment. The statute was intended to deter SLAPP litigation not only at the trial court level, but also in the appellate courts in order to protect the proper exercise of rights under U.S. Const. amend. I. The trial court's judgment was affirmed. Appellant's defectively pleaded complaint facially appeared to be a anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation suit, and appellant failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claim. Respondent was entitled to reasonable attorney fees in defending against the suit, and perfecting of the appeal did not automatically stay enforcement of the judgment without posting of an appeal bond. |
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